Discussion: Mere Christianity

[Kolbitar]

Wolf, I'm in the middle of composing a response to your other points, but let me just quickly address your last one.

::Kolbitar, Lewis was very wrong in your first point (last paragraph). There are people who do not behave as though some things are good and other things are bad (in other words, they do not have the visceral response to morality that drives them to do good).

But Lewis resorts not necessarily to conscience--not to the feeling of guilt-- but to the reaction of fairness. A person without a conscience still makes choices for some appearance of good. Elsewhere he is very clear--The Discarded Image, for example--that morality is not, itself, conscience, not feeling, it is a matter of intuition, of intellectual seeing, and was understood that way until the eighteenth century. He says passion was not opposed to conscience but to reason, therefore morality is a matter of will and intellect.

::Now here's the kicker (and, frankly, I believe this is a checkmate in two moves). What is it about us that can apprehend morality if it is not our material brain?

Our intellect. How is that a move toward checkmate for you?

[WolfVanZandt]

I already said that the presence of a conscience wasn't necessary to Lewis' theory. Your the one who brought that up.

So, let's outline my theory:

The moral law is a product of the biological imperative. (That's the theory.)

The biological imperative is, further, a generalization of homeostasis (simple definition).

The goal is survival, not only of the individual but anything else that the individual identifies with self (if the biological imperative works toward the survival of self, anything identified with self is included.) (What is moral is survival oriented, if not for the individual, then for others.)

The moral law is perceived as a drive, the biological imperative generates drives so it could be a source for the moral law.

But an internal moral law would have to be apprehended by something and your problem seems to be that that something has to be capable of self-reflection, right - or do some of the other points need to be rewarmed?

You say that the material brain isn't capable of self reflection but we do apprehend the moral law so if it is not the internal material brain, then what do we apprehend it with?

If the material brain is capable of apprehending an internal moral law, then my argument is plausible and that would make it a plausible countertheory to Lewis', thus weakening his theory (because, since there is another plausible theory, his is not necessarily correct).

[WolfVanZandt]

"Our intellect" isn't a thing - it's a function. Now, what is it a function of if not the material brain?

[Kolbitar]

::I already said that the presence of a conscience wasn't necessary to Lewis' theory.

Didn't you just say the absence of your conscience shows that Lewis' point is wrong?

[WolfVanZandt]

His point, yes, but not his theory. I don't think that the first point you mentioned in yesterday's post of 9:50 am is necessary to his theory

If the moral law is external to human individuals, what didfference does it make whether "every single one of us acts and must act as if some things are really good and some things are reall bad."

If it is necessary to his theory, then his theory is cooked (goose-wise) and we're done here.

[Kolbitar]

::His point, yes, but not his theory. I don't think that the first point you mentioned in yesterday's post of 9:50 am is necessary to his theory

No Wolf, his point is not wrong, that's my point: it doesn't deal with conscience so your point about not having one is irrelevant. He says it's an idea we cannot get rid of, thus an imperitve, it's a part of our very conscious existence. Now it becomes a matter of governing our actions so that this imperitive can be followed out in an objectively good fashion, so that we act or fail to act on various impulses. This is his whole point. We are able to rise above our instincts via the use of our rationality in order to govern them according to reason.

::If the moral law is external to human individuals, what didfference does it make whether "every single one of us acts and must act as if some things are really good and some things are reall bad."

Because we're now obligated to seek what's really good and avoid what's really bad!

Jesse

[WolfVanZandt]

Well, I don't see it, but if you say so, I guess his theory's cooked because I can assure you that there is a significant number of people around that do not necessarily behave as though some things are necessarily good and some are necessarily bad (a lot of them are in prison) - but then, a biological imperative would do the same thing.

BTW, if you ever decide to address the points of my theory, do it point by point so that we can actually discuss them instead of inundating me.


Let's look at it from a moral imperative POV and a responsible psychopath's POV. What's the difference between:

1) I don't want to steal that money because it makes me feel bad to think about it. I don't think I'll steal that money

and

2) I don't want to steal that money because if I do, and my neighbors find out about it, the best that will happen is they won't trust me anymore and I won't have any friends left and the worst is that they'll put me in jail and I won't get to do what I want to do and that would really stink. Well, I guess somebody might shoot me. I don't think I'll stealthat money.

Thank you.

[Kolbitar]

[Kolbitar]

::Well, I don't see it, but if you say so, I guess his theory's cooked because I can assure you that there is a significant number of people around that do not necessarily behave as though some things are necessarily good and some are necessarily bad (a lot of them are in prison) - but then, a biological imperative would do the same thing.

Hey Wolf. Lewis' theory is only cooked if people who don't have a conscience also do not have a sense of unfairness. For it is fairness that Lewis appeals to in order to evidence the fact that we cannot get rid of the idea of right and wrong. If you can acknowledge this I will go on to answer your points.

::Let's look at it from a moral imperative POV and a responsible psychopath's POV. What's the difference between:
1) I don't want to steal that money because it makes me feel bad to think about it. I don't think I'll steal that money
and
2) I don't want to steal that money because if I do, and my neighbors find out about it, the best that will happen is they won't trust me anymore and I won't have any friends left and the worst is that they'll put me in jail and I won't get to do what I want to do and that would really stink. Well, I guess somebody might shoot me. I don't think I'll stealthat money.

You appear to be using the moral imperitive view synonomously with the view that it necessarily entails conscience. I don't agree with that use, so I'll respond to your question as if you're asking me what the difference is between the point of view of a person with a conscience, and one without... The difference is the person with a conscience has a guilty feeling, but the reasons are the same! the feeling simply adds a support.

Thanks,

Jesse

[WolfVanZandt]

[Kolbitar]

[WolfVanZandt]

[Kolbitar]

Wolf, I want to keep this extremely focused.

Point 1.

Earlier I wrote:

::1.) Every single one of us acts and must act as if some things are really good, and some things really bad--that's a fact of our conscious existence whether we acknowledge it or not.

You responded to what I wrote:

::"Lewis was very wrong in your first point (last paragraph). There are people who do not behave as though some things are good and other things are bad."

Now you write:

::psychopaths are interested in how others treat them because they want to avoid pain and inconvenience.

Exactly! They want to avoid these things because they think they are bad! Therefore they act and must act as if some things are really good, and some things really bad. It doesn't matter if they reflect on this and understand it abstractly, it is, none the less, "a fact of our conscious existence whether we acknowledge it or not."

Let me know if I need to clarify anything...

Thanks,

Jesse

[WolfVanZandt]

[Kolbitar]